Paper Detail

Nonexistence of Simultaneously EF1 and Pareto Optimal Allocations for Submodular Valuations

Harish Chandramouleeswaran, Prajakta Nimbhorkar

arxiv Score 5.8

Published 2026-07-20 · First seen 2026-07-21

General AI

Abstract

The existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are simultaneously fair (envy-free up to one item (EF1)) and efficient (Pareto optimal (PO)) when agents have monotone submodular valuations has been a longstanding open problem. We settle this question negatively by giving an example with two agents where no allocation is simultaneously EF1 and PO. We also show that determining the existence of such allocations is NP-hard for monotone submodular valuations. Our example uses (unweighted) coverage valuations, which is a strict subclass of monotone submodular valuations. Since EF1+PO allocations are known to always exist for additive valuations via the maximization of Nash Social Welfare (Caragiannis et al. (ACM TEAC 2019)), and for matroid-rank valuations (Benabbou et al. (ACM TEAC 2021)), nonexistence was known only for monotone subadditive valuations (Caragiannis et al. (ACM TEAC 2019)). Our work moves the nonexistence frontier to unweighted coverage valuations. We also show that the example we designed for goods also proves nonexistence of EF1+PO in general, for chores with unweighted coverage costs, by interpreting the valuations as disutilities.

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BibTeX

@article{chandramouleeswaran2026nonexistence,
  title = {Nonexistence of Simultaneously EF1 and Pareto Optimal Allocations for Submodular Valuations},
  author = {Harish Chandramouleeswaran and Prajakta Nimbhorkar},
  year = {2026},
  abstract = {The existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are simultaneously fair (envy-free up to one item (EF1)) and efficient (Pareto optimal (PO)) when agents have monotone submodular valuations has been a longstanding open problem. We settle this question negatively by giving an example with two agents where no allocation is simultaneously EF1 and PO. We also show that determining the existence of such allocations is NP-hard for monotone submodular valuations. Our example uses (unweighted) cov},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.18220},
  keywords = {cs.GT, cs.DS},
  eprint = {2607.18220},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
}

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