Paper Detail

Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement

Yiling Chen, Shi Feng, Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu

arxiv Score 12.2

Published 2026-11-05 · First seen 2026-11-07

General AI

Abstract

Ordinal information is central to tasks ranging from conference peer review to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback for large language models. In many such settings, there is no objective ground truth against which reports can be directly verified, making incentive-compatible elicitation challenging. Peer-prediction mechanisms have been designed to achieve truthful elicitation despite the lack of ground-truth verification. However, existing peer-prediction methods do not provide incentives for agents to truthfully compress rich private information (e.g. reviews) into coarser ordinal reports (e.g. rankings) requested by the mechanisms. We propose a simple ordinal peer-prediction mechanism that rewards agents based on pairwise agreement, measured by Kendall tau. Under a broad class of Bayesian Stochastically Order Consistent models---which includes classical models such as Mallows and Thurstone---we prove that truthful reporting is stochastically dominant, and strongly truthful under index-equivariant strategies. This provides robust incentives even for agents with non-linear utility functions, such as risk aversion. Our mechanism further accommodates heterogeneous agents, top-K reports, and subset assignments, where each agent is scored against one randomly drawn peer. Experiments on synthetic Mallows and Thurstone data, together with a real-data stress test on the SUSHI preference dataset, show right-shifted truthful-payment distributions and the highest normalized sensitivity among tested baselines.

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BibTeX

@article{chen2026information,
  title = {Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement},
  author = {Yiling Chen and Shi Feng and Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu},
  year = {2026},
  abstract = {Ordinal information is central to tasks ranging from conference peer review to Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback for large language models. In many such settings, there is no objective ground truth against which reports can be directly verified, making incentive-compatible elicitation challenging. Peer-prediction mechanisms have been designed to achieve truthful elicitation despite the lack of ground-truth verification. However, existing peer-prediction methods do not provide incentives},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08366},
  keywords = {cs.GT},
  eprint = {2611.08366},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
}

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