Paper Detail

Strategic Arbitrage in Electricity Markets: A Multi-Agent Policy Optimization Framework

Eli Brock, Srikar Babu Gadipudi, Somayeh Sojoudi, Javad Lavaei

arxiv Score 7.5

Published 2026-10-21 · First seen 2026-10-23

Research Track A · General AI

Abstract

Grid-scale storage and load aggregators are growing quickly in wholesale electricity markets. If highly consolidated, these new participants may distort the competitive market equilibrium through strategic withholding behavior. Traditional market power mitigation techniques are ill-suited to arbitrage-based participants. We provide a multi-agent policy optimization model to study game-theoretic equilibria for real-time markets with consolidated storage and/or aggregators. The model is designed to facilitate natural first-order equilibrium-seeking update rules. We analyze the theoretical properties of different supply functions and their implications on the convergence of the gradient dynamics. Finally, we train equilibrium policies for a modified version of the IEEE RTS-GMLC benchmark across different levels of storage fleet consolidation, to demonstrate the potential of the framework as a tool to characterize and quantify strategic arbitrage.

Workflow Status

Review status
pending
Role
unreviewed
Read priority
soon
Vote
Not set.
Saved
no
Collections
Not filed yet.
Next action
Not filled yet.

Reading Brief

No structured notes yet. Add `summary_sections`, `why_relevant`, `claim_impact`, or `next_action` in `papers.jsonl` to enrich this view.

Why It Surfaced

No ranking explanation is available yet.

Tags

No tags.

BibTeX

@article{brock2026strategic,
  title = {Strategic Arbitrage in Electricity Markets: A Multi-Agent Policy Optimization Framework},
  author = {Eli Brock and Srikar Babu Gadipudi and Somayeh Sojoudi and Javad Lavaei},
  year = {2026},
  abstract = {Grid-scale storage and load aggregators are growing quickly in wholesale electricity markets. If highly consolidated, these new participants may distort the competitive market equilibrium through strategic withholding behavior. Traditional market power mitigation techniques are ill-suited to arbitrage-based participants. We provide a multi-agent policy optimization model to study game-theoretic equilibria for real-time markets with consolidated storage and/or aggregators. The model is designed t},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30446},
  keywords = {eess.SY},
  eprint = {2610.30446},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
}

Metadata

{}