Paper Detail
Yingtao Ren, Ziyi Zhao, Yiwei Fu, Xiao Luo, Yu-Cheng Chang, Chin-Teng Lin
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is indispensable for enhancing large language models. However, RAGs are increasingly susceptible to poisoning attacks, in which adversarial documents are injected to manipulate generator outputs. Previous methods rely on output-side signals such as perplexity and consistency checks to detect such attacks. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that deliberate attacks often induce false confidence, where poisoned outputs exhibit even lower perplexity than benign ones, rendering uncertainty-based detection ineffective. To address this challenge, we explore the internal dynamics of the generator and identify a distinctive signature termed Attention Collapse. Unlike the dispersed attention in benign generations, attacked generations exhibit a decrease in entropy as attention concentrates on poisoned documents. Building on these findings, we propose D-SCAN (Document-level Signal Collapse Analysis), a lightweight detection framework that monitors attention dynamics to identify attacked generations. Extensive experiments on multiple attack benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Moreover, D-SCAN can detect attacks even when they fail to alter the final answer. Code is available at https://github.com/yingtaoren/D-Scan.git.
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@misc{ren2026when,
title = {When Context Bites: Detecting RAG Poisoning via Document-Level Attention Collapse},
author = {Yingtao Ren and Ziyi Zhao and Yiwei Fu and Xiao Luo and Yu-Cheng Chang and Chin-Teng Lin},
year = {2026},
abstract = {Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is indispensable for enhancing large language models. However, RAGs are increasingly susceptible to poisoning attacks, in which adversarial documents are injected to manipulate generator outputs. Previous methods rely on output-side signals such as perplexity and consistency checks to detect such attacks. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that deliberate attacks often induce false confidence, where poisoned outputs exhibit even lower perplexity than benign o},
url = {https://huggingface.co/papers/2608.06947},
keywords = {retrieval-augmented generation, poisoning attacks, perplexity, attention collapse, attention entropy, D-SCAN, huggingface daily},
eprint = {2608.06947},
archiveprefix = {arXiv},
}
{}